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Abstract
We deal with the fragment of modal logic consisting of implications of for-
mulas built up from the variables and the constant ‘true’ by conjunction and
diamonds only. The weaker language allows one to interpret the diamonds
as the uniform reflection schemata in arithmetic, possibly of unrestricted
logical complexity. We formulate an arithmetically complete calculus with
modalities labeled by natural numbers and ω, where ω corresponds to the
full uniform reflection schema, whereas n < ω corresponds to its restriction
to arithmetical Πn+1-formulas. This calculus is shown to be complete w.r.t.
a suitable class of finite Kripke models and to be decidable in polynomial
time.
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1. Introduction
Several applications of provability logic in proof theory made use of a
polymodal logic GLP due to Giorgi Japaridze [17, 9]. This system, al-
though decidable, is not very easy to handle. In particular, it is not Kripke
complete [9]. It is complete w.r.t. the more general topological semantics,
however this could only be established recently by rather complicated tech-
niques [2].
Email address: bekl@mi.ras.ru (Lev Beklemishev)
URL: http://www.mi.ras.ru/~bekl (Lev Beklemishev)
1Also affiliated at: Moscow M.V. Lomonosov State University and National Research
University Higher School of Economics.
Preprint submitted to Annals of Pure and Applied Logic October 22, 2018
A weaker system, called Reflection Calculus and denoted RC, was intro-
duced in [8]. It is much simpler than GLP yet expressive enough to regain
its main proof-theoretic applications. It has been outlined in [8] that RC
allows to define a natural system of ordinal notations up to ε0 and serves as
a convenient basis for a proof-theoretic analysis of Peano Arithmetic in the
style of [4, 5]. This includes a consistency proof for PA based on transfinite
induction up to ε0, a characterization of its Π
0
n-consequences in terms of
iterated reflection principles, and a combinatorial independence result.
From the point of view of modal logic, RC can be seen as a fragment of
polymodal logic consisting of implications of the form A→ B, where A and
B are formulas built-up from ⊤ and propositional variables using just ∧ and
the diamond modalities. We call such formulas A and B strictly positive
and will often omit the word ‘strictly.’2
A somewhat different but equivalent axiomatization of RC (as an equa-
tional calculus) has been earlier found by Evgeny Dashkov in his paper [11]
which initiated the study of strictly positive fragments of provability logics.
Dashkov proved two important further facts about RC which sharply con-
trast with the corresponding properties of GLP. Firstly, RC is complete
with respect to a natural class of finite Kripke frames. Secondly, RC is
decidable in polynomial time, whereas most of the standard modal logics
(including GL and GLP) are PSpace-complete.
Another advantage of going to a strictly positive language is explored in
the present paper. Strictly positive modal formulas allow for more general
arithmetical interpretations than those of the standard modal logic language.
In particular, propositional formulas can now be interpreted as arithmetical
theories rather than individual sentences. (Notice that the ‘negation’ of a
theory would not be well-defined.)
Similarly, the diamonds need no longer be interpreted as individual con-
sistency assertions but as the more general reflection schemata not neces-
sarily having finite axiomatizations. Thus, for example, the full uniform
reflection schema can be considered as a modality in the context of positive
provability logic (see [18, 5] for general information on reflection principles).
Such interpretations are not only natural but can be useful for further devel-
opment of the approach to proof-theoretic analysis via provability algebras.
Thus, positive provability logic allows to speak about certain notions not
2Traditionally, positive modal formulas may also involve disjunctions and box modal-
ities. However, in the present paper we will not consider positive formulas in this more
general sense.
2
nicely representable in the context of the standard modal logic.
The main contribution of this paper is a Solovay-style arithmetical com-
pleteness result for an extension of RC by a new modality corresponding to
the unrestricted uniform reflection principle. This is the primary example of
a modality not representable in the full modal logic language. The system
obtained is shown to be decidable and to enjoy a suitable complete Kripke
semantics along with the finite model property.
Whereas the modal logic part of our theorem is a simple extension of
Dashkov’s results, the arithmetical part is more substantial. We introduce
a new modification of the Solovay construction using some previous ideas
from [17, 16, 7]. Since the arithmetical complexity of the unform reflec-
tion schema is unbounded, a single Solovay-style function is not enough for
our purpose. Instead, we deal with infinitely many Solovay functions, of
increasing arithmetical complexity, uniformly and simultaneously.3
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we introduce positive modal
language and the systems leading to the arithmetically complete reflection
calculus RCω. Secondly, we present the details of its arithmetical interpre-
tation and somewhat tediously prove the corresponding soundness theorem.
Thirdly, we study the Kripke semantics of positive provability logics and ob-
tain completeness results, along with a suitable version of the finite model
property. Fourthly, we obtain polynomial complexity bounds for the deriv-
ability problem in RCω by adapting the techniques of Dashkov. Finally, we
prove the main result of this paper, the arithmetical completeness theorem
for RCω.
2. Reflection calculus and its basic properties
Consider a modal language L with propositional variables p, q,. . . , a
constant ⊤ and connectives ∧ and α, for each ordinal α 6 ω (understood
as diamond modalities). Strictly positive formulas (or simply formulas) are
built up by the grammar:
A ::= p | ⊤ | (A ∧B) | αA, where α 6 ω.
Sequents are expressions of the form A ⊢ B where A,B are strictly positive
formulas. The system RJ is given by the following axioms and rules:
3An interesting arithmetical completeness proof for an extension of modal logic GLP
by transfinitely many modalities has recently appeared in [13]. However, the considered
interpretation is different and not applicable in our situation.
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1. A ⊢ A; A ⊢ ⊤; if A ⊢ B and B ⊢ C then A ⊢ C (syllogism);
2. A ∧B ⊢ A; A ∧B ⊢ B; if A ⊢ B and A ⊢ C then A ⊢ B ∧ C;
3. if A ⊢ B then αA ⊢ αB; ααA ⊢ αA;
4. αβA ⊢ βA; βαA ⊢ βA for α > β;
5. αA ∧ βB ⊢ α(A ∧ βB) for α > β.
The systems RC and RCω are obtained fromRJ by adding respectively
one or two of the following principles:
6. αA ⊢ βA for α > β; (monotonicity)
7. ωA ⊢ A. (persistence)
Dashkov [11] showed that RJ, restricted to the language without ω
modality, axiomatizes the strictly positive fragment of the polymodal logic
J [6], whereas RC axiomatizes the strictly positive fragment of GLP.
Notice that Axioms 4 are redundant in the presence of Axiom 6: if α > β
then αβA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA and βαA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA.
If L is a logic, we write A ⊢L B for the statement that the sequent A ⊢ B
is provable in L. As a simple example, consider the sequent
ω(p ∧ q) ⊢ (ωp ∧ ωq).
It is provable in RJ as follows: We have p ∧ q ⊢ p, hence ω(p ∧ q) ⊢ ωp.
Similarly, ω(p ∧ q) ⊢ ωq, therefore ω(p ∧ q) ⊢ (ωp ∧ ωq), by the conjunction
rules. In contrast, (ωp∧ωq) 0RCω ω(p∧q), as we shall see below by a simple
Kripke model argument.
Formulas A and B are called L-equivalent (written A ∼L B) if A ⊢L B
and B ⊢L A.
We also consider the fragments of various logics obtained by restrict-
ing the language to a subset of modalities. Such a subset S ⊆ ω + 1 =
{0, 1, . . . , ω} is called a signature. We denote by LS the set of all strictly
positive formulas in S. Similarly, for a logic L in L we denote by LS the
restriction of the axioms and rules of L to the language LS.
For a positive formula A, let ℓ(A) denote {α 6 ω : α occurs in A}.
Lemma 2.1. (i) If A ⊢RJ B then ℓ(B) ⊆ ℓ(A);
(ii) If A ⊢L B where L is RC or RCω, then ℓ(B) ⊆ [0,max ℓ(A)].
Proof. In each case, this is proved by an easy induction on the length of
the derivation of A ⊢ B. ✷
Let C[A/p] denote the result of replacing in C all occurrences of a vari-
able p by A. If a logic L contains Axioms 1, 2 and the first part of 3, then
⊢L satisfies the following positive replacement lemma.
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Lemma 2.2. Suppose A ⊢L B, then C[A/p] ⊢L C[B/p], for any C.
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. ✷
A positive logic L is called normal if it contains the rules 1, 2, and the
first part of 3, and is closed under the following substitution rule: if A ⊢L B
then A[C/p] ⊢L B[C/p]. It is clear that RJ, RC and RCω, as well as their
restricted versions, are normal.
3. Arithmetical interpretation
We define the intended arithmetical interpretation of the positive modal
language. The idea is that propositional variables (and positive formulas)
now denote possibly infinite theories rather than individual sentences. To
avoid possible problems with the representation of theories in the language
of PA, we deal with primitive recursive numerations of theories rather than
with the theories as sets of sentences.
All theories in this paper will be formulated in the language of Peano
Arithmetic PA and contain the axioms of PA. It is convenient to assume
that the language of PA contains the symbols for all primitive recursive
programs. A primitive recursive numeration of a theory S is a bounded
arithmetical formula σ(x) defining the set of Go¨del numbers of the axioms
of S in the standard model of arithmetic. Given such a σ, we have a standard
arithmetical Σ1-formula ✷σ(x) expressing the provability of x in S (see [12]).
We often write ✷σϕ for ✷σ(pϕq). The expression n¯ denotes the numeral
0′ · · ·′ (n times). If ϕ(v) contains a parameter v, then ✷σϕ(x¯) denotes a
formula (with a parameter x) expressing the provability of the sentence
ϕ(x¯/v) in S.
Given two numerations σ and τ , we write σ ⊢PA τ if
PA ⊢ ∀x (✷τ (x)→ ✷σ(x)).
We write σ ⊢ τ if N  ∀x (✷τ (x)→ ✷σ(x)), that is, if the theory numerated
by σ contains the one numerated by τ . We will only consider the numerations
σ such that σ ⊢PA σPA, where σPA is some standard numeration of PA.
With any finite extension of PA of the form PA+ ϕ we will associate its
standard numeration σPA ∨ (x = pϕq) that will be denoted ϕ. For obvious
reasons we have: ϕ ⊢PA ψ iff ϕ ⊢ ψ iff PA+ ϕ ⊢ ψ. (The statement ϕ ⊢PA ψ
implies PA + ϕ ⊢ ψ by the soundness of PA, the converse is formalizable in
PA.)
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Given a numeration σ of S, the consistency of S is expressed by Con(σ) :=
¬✷σ⊥. A theory S is called n-consistent if S together with the set of all
true Σn+1-sentences is consistent. The n-consistency of S is expressed by
the formula
Conn(σ) : ∀x ∈ Πn+1 (✷σ(x)→ Tn(x)),
where Tn is the standard Πn+1-truthdefinition for Πn+1-formulas (see [14])
and x ∈ Πn+1 denotes the primitive recursive formula expressing that x is
a Go¨del number of a Πn+1-sentence.
Concerning the truthdefinitions we assume that PA ⊢ ϕ↔ Tn(pϕq), for
each Πn+1-sentence ϕ. Moreover, this very fact can be formalized in PA
uniformly in n:
PA ⊢ ∀n ∀x ∈ Πn+1 ✷PA(x↔ Tn(x¯)), (1)
as the sequence of formulas pTnq is primitive recursive in n and the corre-
sponding proofs are constructed inductively.
The formula Conn(σ) is often called the global Πn+1-reflection principle
for S and is denoted RFNΠn+1(S) (see [19, 3]). We note that the formula
Con0(σ) is PA-provably equivalent to Con(σ).
The uniform reflection principle for S is the schema
Conω(σ) : {Conn(σ) : n ∈ ω}.
It is well-known that Conω(σ) is PA-provably equivalent to the schema
∀x (✷σϕ(x¯)→ ϕ(x)),
for each arithmetical formula ϕ(x), which is usually denoted RFN(S).
The uniform reflection principle is elementarily axiomatized, and we fix
a standard function mapping any numeration σ to the numeration of PA+
Conω(σ) (denoted Conω(σ)). Similarly, the formula
σPA(x) ∨ x = pConn(σ)q
numerating the theory PA+Conn(σ) will be denoted Conn(σ).
The intended arithmetical interpretation maps positive modal formulas
to primitive recursive numerations in such a way that ⊤ corresponds to
the standard numeration of PA, ∧ corresponds to the union of theories, n
corresponds to the standard numeration of Conn, for each n < ω, and ω to
the standard numeration of Conω.
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Definition 3.1. An arithmetical interpretation is a map ∗ from positive
modal formulas to numerations satisfying the following conditions:
• ⊤∗ = σPA; (A ∧B)
∗ = (A∗ ∨B∗);
• (nA)∗ = Conn(A
∗); (ωA)∗ = Conω(A
∗).
It is clear that the value A∗ is completely determined by the interpreta-
tions p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n of all the variables occurring in A.
Proposition 3.2 (soundness). Suppose A ⊢RCω B, then A
∗ ⊢PA B
∗, for
all arithmetical interpretations ∗.
Proof. Induction on the length of proof of A ⊢ B in RCω. The validity of
the first two groups of rules of RCω is obvious. We treat the modal axioms
and rules.
If σ ⊢PA τ then clearly Conn(σ) ⊢PA Conn(τ), for each n < ω. Since this
fact is formalizable in PA, we also obtain Conω(σ) ⊢PA Conω(τ). Also, the
validity of the monotonicity axioms 6 is clear. Next we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.3. (i) Let S be numerated by σ and ϕ ∈ Πn+1. If S ⊢ ϕ then
PA+Conn(σ) ⊢ ϕ;
(ii) Statement (i) holds provably in PA uniformly in n, that is,
PA ⊢ ∀n ∀x ∈ Πn+1 (✷σ(x)→ ✷Conn(σ)(x)).
Proof. We only prove Statement (ii). We reason in PA as follows.
Assume x ∈ Πn+1 and ✷σ(x). Then ✷PA(x¯ ∈ Πn+1 ∧ ✷σ(x¯)). On the
other hand, by the definition of Conn(σ)
✷Conn(σ)
∀y (✷σ(y) ∧ y ∈ Πn+1 → Tn(y)).
This yields
✷Conn(σ)
(✷σ(x¯) ∧ x¯ ∈ Πn+1 → Tn(x¯)),
so we obtain ✷Conn(σ)Tn(x¯), and hence ✷Conn(σ)(x) by (1). ✷
Corollary 3.4. (i) Conn(Conn(σ)) ⊢PA Conn(σ), for all n < ω;
(ii) Conω(Conω(σ)) ⊢PA Conω(σ).
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Proof. Since the theories numerated by Conn(σ) and Conn(Conn(σ)) are
finite extensions of PA, for a proof of Statement (i) it is sufficient to show
PA+Conn(Conn(σ)) ⊢ Conn(σ). (2)
Since Conn(σ) is a Πn+1-sentence, we can take in Lemma 3.3 ϕ = Conn(σ)
and S = PA + ϕ. This yields statement (2).
For a proof of (ii), we show an informal version of this statement by an
argument formalizable in PA. We must prove that, for each n < ω,
PA +Conω(Conω(σ)) ⊢ Conn(σ).
Using the monotonicity and Statement (i) we reason as follows:
Conω(Conω(σ)) ⊢PA Conn(Conω(σ)) ⊢PA Conn(Conn(σ)) ⊢PA Conn(σ).
This shows the claim. ✷
Corollary 3.4 shows the soundness of the third group of rules of RCω.
As we mentioned above, the fourth group is actually derivable from the first
three and the monotonicity, so we can skip it. We show the soundness of
Axiom 5.
Lemma 3.5. If n > m then PA ⊢ Conn(σ)∧Conm(τ)→ Conn(σ∨Conm(τ)).
Proof. We reason in PA as follows: If ϕ ∈ Πn+1 and ✷σ∨Conm(τ)(ϕ),
then by the formalized deduction theorem ✷σ(Conm(τ) → ϕ). Since m <
n, the formula Conm(τ) → ϕ belongs to Πn+1. By Conn(σ) we obtain
Tn(pConm(τ) → ϕq) whence Tn(pConm(τ)q) → Tn(pϕq). Since Conm(τ) ∈
Πn+1, from Conm(τ) we infer Tn(pConm(τ)q). Hence Tn(pϕq), as required.
✷
Corollary 3.6. Conω(σ) ∨Conm(τ) ⊢PA Conω(σ ∨Conm(τ)).
Proof. Informally, we must prove, for each n, that
PA+Conω(σ) + Conm(τ) ⊢ Conn(σ ∨ Conm(τ)).
We can assume n > m and then use the previous lemma. This argument is
formalizable in PA. ✷
Corollary 3.7. Conω(σ) ⊢PA σ.
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Proof. We reason as follows:
PA ⊢ ✷σ(x) → ∃n (x ∈ Πn+1 ∧ ✷σ(x))
→ ∃n ✷Conn(σ)(x)
→ ✷Conω(σ)(x). ⊠
This shows the soundness of the remaining Axiom 7 of RC and completes
the proof of Proposition 3.2. ✷
4. Kripke models for RCω
Kripke frames and models are understood in this paper in the usual
sense. A Kripke frame W for the language LS consists of a non-empty set
W equipped with a family of binary relations (Rα)α∈S . A Kripke frame W
is called finite if so is W and all but finitely many relations Rα are empty.
A Kripke model W is a Kripke frame together with a valuation v :
W × Var → {0, 1} assigning a truth value to each propositional variable at
every node of W. As usual, we write W, x  A to denote that a formula
A is true at a node x of a model W. This relation is inductively defined as
follows:
• W, x  p ⇐⇒ v(x, p) = 1, for each p ∈ Var;
• W, x  ⊤; W, x  A ∧B ⇐⇒ (W, x  A and W, x  B);
• W, x  αA ⇐⇒ ∃y (xRαy and W, y  A).
We call a RJS-frame a Kripke frame satisfying the following conditions,
for all α, β ∈ S and all x, y, z ∈W :
• xRαyRβz implies xRγz, if γ = min(α, β); (polytransitivity)
• xRαy and xRβz implies yRβz, if α > β. (condition J)
These conditions can be more succinctly written as RαRβ ⊆ Rmin(α,β) and
R−1α Rβ ⊆ Rβ. An RCS-frame is an RJS-frame that is monotone, that is,
Rα ⊆ Rβ, for each β < α. An RJS-model (RCS-model), respectively, is a
Kripke model based on an RJS-frame (RCS-frame). We speak about RJ-
and RC-frames and models whenever S = ω + 1.
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The persistence axiom ωA ⊢ A does not correspond to a frame condi-
tion.4 We call a Kripke model (downwards) persistent if, for each variable
p,
W, x  p and yRωx⇒W, y  p.
By a straightforward induction we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let W be a persistent Kripke model based on a polytransitive
frame. Then, for each positive formula A,
W, x  A and yRωx⇒W, y  A.
We say that a sequent A ⊢ B is true in a Kripke model W, if
∀x ∈ W (W, x  A ⇒ W, x  B).
A logic L is sound for a class C of Kripke models (of the same signature), if
every sequent A ⊢ B provable in L is true in any model from C. It is easy
to see that our logics are sound for their respective classes of models.
Lemma 4.2. (i) RJS is sound for the class of all RJS-models;
(ii) RCS is sound for the class of all RCS-models;
(iii) RCωS is sound for the class of all persistent RCS-models.
A proof of this lemma is routine.
Notice that the frame conditions for the logics RJS and RCS (that
is, polytransitivity, condition J, and monotonicity) are closure conditions.
Therefore, for any Kripke frame W = (W, (Rα)α∈S) there is an RJS-frame
(RCS -frame) W = (W, (Rα)α∈S) such that
• Rα ⊆ Rα, for each α ∈ S;
• For any other RJS-frame (RCS-frame) (W, (R
′
α)α∈S) with Rα ⊆ R
′
α,
for all α ∈ S, we have Rα ⊆ R
′
α, for all α ∈ S.
The frame W is unique up to isomorphism. We call it the RJS-closure
(RCS-closure) of W.
4Notice that the more familiar form of this axiom is the principle A → ✷A which has
no non-discrete frames.
10
Example 4.3. Consider a Kripke frame W = (W, (Rα)α6ω) with W =
{0, 1, 2}. Relation Rω consists of two pairs 0Rω1 and 0Rω2, and the other
relations are empty. Let W be the RC-closure of W. It is easy to see that
Rω = Rω, whereas, for each n < ω, Rn ↾ {1, 2} is a total relation, 0Rn1 and
0Rn2.
Further, we define v(x, p) = 0 iff x = 2, and v(x, q) = 0 iff x = 1. This
makes (W , v) a downwards persistent RC-model falsifying ωp∧ωq ⊢ ω(p∧q)
at 0. By Lemma 4.2 we conclude ωp ∧ ωq 0RCω ω(p ∧ q).
The completeness proofs in all these cases are also easy. As in Dashkov [11],
we present an argument based on a (simplified) version of filtrated canonical
model.
Let Φ be a set of L-formulas. Denote ℓ(Φ) := {α 6 ω : α occurs in some A ∈ Φ}.
A set Φ is called adequate if Φ is closed under subformulas, ⊤ ∈ Φ and
• If βA ∈ Φ and β < α ∈ ℓ(Φ), then αA ∈ Φ;
• For any variable p, if p ∈ Φ then ωp ∈ Φ.
It is easy to see that any finite set of formulas can be extended to a finite
adequate set.
Let Γ be a set of L-formulas and L a logic. We shall take for L one
of RJ, RC or RCω, or their restricted versions in the language LS where
S ⊆ ω+ 1. We write Γ ⊢L B if there are formulas A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ such that
the sequent A1 ∧ · · · ∧An ⊢ B is provable in L.
Fix an adequate set of formulas Φ. An L-theory in Φ is a set x ⊆ Φ such
that x ⊢L A and A ∈ Φ implies A ∈ x. Define a model WL/Φ as follows.
The set of nodes WL/Φ is the set of all L-theories in Φ.
5 We stipulate that
xRαy iff α ∈ ℓ(Φ) and the following conditions hold for each formula A:
R1. A ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ implies αA ∈ x;
R2. βA ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ implies min(α, β)A ∈ x;
R3. β < α and βA ∈ x implies βA ∈ y.
We also let WL/Φ, x  p iff p ∈ x, for any L-theory x.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose L contains RJS with S = ℓ(Φ). Then WL/Φ is an
RJS-model.
5In positive logic there is no harm in allowing an ‘inconsistent’ theory x = Φ as a node.
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Proof. To check the polytransitivity assume xRαyRβz and α, β ∈ ℓ(Φ). We
show xRmin(α,β)z by checking R1–R3. If A ∈ z and min(α, β)A ∈ Φ, then
by the adequacy βA ∈ Φ and hence βA ∈ y. It follows that min(α, β)A ∈ x.
For R2 notice that min(γ, α, β) = min(γ,min(α, β)). If γA ∈ z and
min(γ, α, β)A ∈ Φ then by the adequacy min(γ, β)A ∈ Φ and hence min(γ, β)A ∈
y. This in turn implies min(γ, β, α)A ∈ x. Condition R3 is obviously satis-
fied, as all three theories have the same formulas of the form βA for β < α.
Second, we check condition (J). Assume xRαy and xRβz with α < β.
We show zRαy. R1: If A ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ then αA ∈ x. Since α < β this
implies αA ∈ z. R2: If γA ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ then min(γ, α)A ∈ x whence
min(γ, α)A ∈ z for the same reason. R3 is, again, obvious. ✷
Lemma 4.5. For any A ∈ Φ, WL/Φ, x  A iff A ∈ x.
Proof. Induction on the build-up of A. If A is a variable, ⊤ or has the form
B ∧ C, the argument is obvious. Assume A = αB.
If x  αB then, for some y such that xRαy, we have y  B. By IH it
follows that B ∈ y and hence αB ∈ x.
Now assume αB ∈ x. Let ∆ := {βC : βC ∈ x, β < α} and let y be the
deductive closure of ∆ ∪ {B} in Φ. By the IH we have y  B. We claim
that xRαy which completes the argument.
AssumeD ∈ y, then Σ, B ⊢L D for some finite Σ ⊆ ∆. Then
∧
Σ∧αB ⊢L
α(
∧
Σ ∧ B) ⊢L αD. Hence, if αD ∈ Φ then αD ∈ y. Similarly, if γD ∈ y
then Σ, B ⊢L γD. Then
∧
Σ ∧ αB ⊢L α(
∧
Σ ∧B) ⊢L αγD ⊢L min(γ, α)D.
If αD ∈ Φ then min(γ, α)D ∈ Φ whence min(γ, α)D ∈ x. Finally, if β < α
and βD ∈ x then βD ∈ ∆, hence βD ∈ y. ✷
Lemma 4.6. (i) If L contains the monotonicity axiom and S = ℓ(Φ),
then WL/Φ is an RCS-frame;
(ii) If L contains the persistence axiom, then WL/Φ is persistent.
Proof. (i) Assume xRαy and β < α ∈ ℓ(Φ). We show xRβy by checking
the three conditions. If A ∈ y and βA ∈ Φ then αA ∈ Φ by the adequacy of
Φ. Hence, αA ∈ x and therefore by the monotonicity axioms x ⊢ βA. Since
βA ∈ Φ we obtain βA ∈ x. Similarly, if γA ∈ y and βA ∈ Φ then αA ∈ Φ
by the adequacy. Therefore, min(α, γ)A ∈ x, whence by the monotonicity
axioms x ⊢ min(β, γ)A. Since both γA and βA are in Φ, it follows that
min(β, γ)A ∈ x which proves the second condition. The third condition is
obviously satisfied.
(ii) Assume xRωy. If y  p then p ∈ y; by the adequacy ωp ∈ Φ and
hence ωp ∈ x. It follows that x ⊢L ωp ⊢L p and x  p. ✷
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Taking Φ = L andWL :=WL/Φ we obtain the completeness of RJ, RC
and RCω w.r.t. their respective classes of models.
Theorem 1. (i) A ⊢RJ B iff A ⊢ B is true in all RJ-models;
(ii) A ⊢RC B iff A ⊢ B is true in all RC-models;
(iii) A ⊢RCω B iff A ⊢ B is true in all persistent RC-models.
Proof. The three systems are sound by Lemma 4.2. The completeness is
proved by observing thatWL, for each of the three logics L, is a model of the
corresponding type. Assume A 0L B. Then letting x denote the L-theory
generated by A we have B /∈ x, hence by Lemma 4.5 WL, x 1 B. ✷
Next we discuss the finite model property of the three logics. For RJ
the answer is obvious, but for RC and RCω we have a small complication
due to the fact that modality ω is present in the language.
Corollary 4.7. A ⊢RJ B iff A ⊢ B is true in all finite RJ-models.
Proof. Assume A 0RJ B, let Φ be a finite adequate set of formulas contain-
ing both A and B. We have WRJ/Φ, x  A and WRJ/Φ, x 1 B. Moreover,
WRJ/Φ is a finite RJS-model, where S = ℓ(Φ). By putting Rα := ∅, for
any α /∈ ℓ(Φ), we expand WRJ/Φ to an RJ-model in L falsifying A ⊢ B. ✷
A similar argument does not quite work for RC, as the expansion by
empty relations leads, in general, outside the class of RC-models. However,
for a finite signature S we do have an analog of Theorem 1.
Corollary 4.8. Suppose S ⊆ ω + 1 is finite.
(i) A ⊢RCS B iff A ⊢ B is true in all finite RCS-models;
(ii) A ⊢RCωS B iff A ⊢ B is true in all finite persistent RCS-models.
Lemma 4.9. Let S ⊆ ω + 1 and α /∈ S. Any RCS-model can be expanded
to an RCS∪{α}-model.
Proof. Let W = (W, (Rβ)β∈S) be a given RCS-model. Denote: S
+ := {β ∈
S : α < β} and S− := {β ∈ S : β < α}. If S+ = ∅ we can put Rα := ∅.
Otherwise, for any relation R on W , denote
R′ := R ∪RR ∪
⋃
β∈S+
R−1β R.
Further, define Rα :=
⋃
n∈ω R
n
α, where R
0
α :=
⋃
β∈S+ Rβ; R
n+1
α := (R
n
α)
′.
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Notice that R ⊆ R′, for any R. It follows that Rβ ⊆ R
0
α ⊆ Rα, for each
β ∈ S+. By the construction, Rα is transitive and R
−1
β Rα ⊆ Rα, hence
condition (J) is satisfied for all α < β ∈ S+. Moreover, the polytransitivity
follows from the transitivity and the monotonicity properties. Therefore,
(W, (Rβ)β∈S+∪{α}) is an RCS+∪{α}-model.
To complete the argument we have to show that (W, (Rγ)γ∈S−∪{α}) is
an RCS−∪{α}-model. To this end we prove that, for each n and γ ∈ S
−,
1. Rnα ⊆ Rγ ;
2. (Rnα)
−1Rγ ⊆ Rγ .
Both statements are verified by induction on n. The basis of induction holds,
since the original model was an RCS-model. Assume the statements hold
for R = Rnα and consider R
′ = Rn+1α .
1. We have R ⊆ Rγ by the IH. Further, RR ⊆ RγRγ ⊆ Rγ , since Rγ is
transitive. For any β ∈ S+, R−1β R ⊆ R
−1
β Rγ ⊆ Rγ , since condition (J) holds
in W. Hence, R′ = R ∪RR ∪
⋃
β∈S+ R
−1
β R ⊆ Rγ , as required.
2. We haveR−1Rγ ⊆ Rγ by the IH. Further, (RR)
−1Rγ = R
−1(R−1Rγ) ⊆
R−1Rγ ⊆ Rγ . Finally, for any β ∈ S
+, (R−1β R)
−1Rγ = R
−1RβRγ ⊆
R−1Rγ ⊆ Rγ . Therefore, (R
′)−1Rγ ⊆ Rγ , as required. ✷
Remark 4.10. The given proof also works for the more general analogs of
RC, e.g., for logics with linearly ordered sets of modalities (see [1]).
Taking into account that expansions of persistent models are persistent,
we obtain the following theorem for both RC and RCω.
Theorem 2. Let L be either RC or RCω. The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) A ⊢L B;
(ii) A ⊢LU B, for some finite U ⊆ ω + 1;
(iii) A ⊢LS B where S = ℓ({A,B}).
Proof. Clearly, (iii) implies (i), and (i) implies (ii) since a finite derivation
may only contain finitely many different modalities. We prove that (ii)
implies (iii). Assume A 0LS B. By Corollary 4.8 there is a finite RCS-
model W falsifying A ⊢ B (which is persistent if L = RCω). Assume any
finite U be given. We may assume S ⊆ U (otherwise clearly A 0LU B).
By Lemma 4.9, W can be expanded to an RCU -model falsifying the same
sequent. Hence, A 0LU B. ✷
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Thus, even though we do not have the finite model property for RC and
RCω in the full language, these logics are conservatively approximated by
their fragments with this property. Together with Corollary 4.8 this yields
Corollary 4.11. The systems RC and RCω are decidable.
For the logics RJ and RC a sharper result can be stated. As we have
seen, the question whether a sequent A ⊢ B is provable in such a logic L
is equivalent to the same question for the logic LS with S = ℓ({A,B}).
However, for any finite S, the logic LS is modulo renaming of modalities the
same logic as Ln for n = |S| (we identify n with the set {0, . . . , n−1}). The
systems Ln are shown to be polytime decidable [11]. Therefore, we obtain
Corollary 4.12. The systems RJ and RC are polytime decidable.
The same result holds for RCω, however we cannot directly refer to
Dashkov’s theorem. This question is considered in the next section, where
we also obtain somewhat sharper complexity estimates for the cases RJ and
RC. The material of that section, up to Theorem 3, is due to Dashkov [11].
5. Polytime decidability of RCω
We have to develop some combinatorial techniques to deal with positive
logics. It allows one to state the Kripke completeness results in a sharper
form, from which the complexity bounds are easily read off.
LetW be a Kripke model and a ∈W . The submodelWa ofW generated
by a is obtained by restricting all the relations and the valuation of W to
the set of all nodes x ∈W such that there is a path a = x0Rx1R . . . Rxn = x
where R =
⋃
α∈S Rα. A model W is called rooted if it has a distinguished
element a (called the root) such that Wa =W. We notice that in polytran-
sitive rooted frames every node is reachable from the root in one step.
Definition 5.1. We can associate with each positive formula A a rooted
treelike Kripke model T [A] in the signature ℓ(A) called its canonical tree. It
is essentially the parse tree of A viewed as a Kripke model.
If A is a variable or ⊤, then T [A] is a one-point model {a} with the
empty relations, and the only variable true at a is A.
If A = B∧C then T [A] is obtained from the disjoint union of the models
T [B] and T [C] by identifying the roots. We declare any variable p true at
the root of T [A] iff it is true at the root of either T [B] or T [C].
IfA = αB then T [A] is obtained from T [B] by adding a new root r (where
all variables are false), from which the root of of T [B] is Rα-accessible.
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We write T [A]  ϕ if ϕ is true at the root of T [A]. Then, one can easily
verify the following properties:
• Each Rα on T [A] is an irreflexive forest-like binary relation;
• T [A]  A.
Definition 5.2. A homomorphism of a Kripke model V into a Kripke model
W (of the same signature S) is a function f : V →W such that
• ∀x, y ∈ V (xRαy ⇒ f(x)Rαf(y)), for each α ∈ S;
• If V, x  p then W, f(x)  p, for each variable p.
Let V and W be rooted Kripke models. A simulation of V by W is a
homomorphism f : V → W mapping the root of V to the root of W.
Lemma 5.3. If A is strictly positive and f is a homomorphism of V into
W, then
V, x  A⇒W, f(x)  A.
Lemma 5.4. W, x  B iff there is a homomorphism f : T [B] → W map-
ping the root of T [B] to x.
Proof. Suppose f : T [B]→W is such a homomorphism. We have T [B], r 
B where r is the root of T [B]. Since B is strictly positive and f(r) = x, by
Lemma 5.3, W, x  B.
Suppose W, x  B. We construct a homomorphism f : T [B] → W by
induction on the complexity of B. If B is a variable or ⊤, the claim is
obvious.
If B = C ∧D then W, x  C,D. By the IH, there are homomorphisms
f, g of the models T [C] and T [D] into W mapping their respective roots to
x. The homomorphism of T [B] maps its root to x and is defined as the
union of f and g everywhere else on T [B]. We note that if T [B]  p then
either T [C]  p or T [D]  p, by the definition of T [B]. In either case we
have W, x  p, therefore the variable condition at the root is met and we
have a homomorphism of T [B] into W.
If B = αC andW, x  B, then there is a node y ∈ W such that xRαy and
W, y  C. By the IH, there is a homomorphism of T [C] into W mapping its
root to y. We extend it by mapping the root of T [B] to x. All the variables
are false at the root of T [B], so the variable condition is met. ✷
Let RCS[A] (RJS[A]) denote the RCS-closure (respectively, RJS-closure)
of T [A], where S ⊇ ℓ(A).
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Theorem 3. (i) A ⊢RJ B iff RJS [A]  B, where S = ℓ(A);
(ii) A ⊢RC B iff RCS[A]  B, where S = ℓ({A,B}).
Proof. We prove Statement (ii). The case of RJ is similar but simpler.
(only if) Since T [A]  A and the relations of RCS [A] extend those of
T [A], we have RCS [A]  A. By Theorem 2, A ⊢RC B implies A ⊢RCS B.
Hence, by Corollary 4.8, RCS [A]  B.
(if) AssumeA 0RC B. There is a rooted RCS-modelW such thatW  A
and W 1 B. By Lemma 5.4, there is a simulation f : T [A] → W. Since
W is an RCS-model, f lifts to a simulation of RCS [A] by W. In fact, we
can define on T [A] new relations R′α by letting xR
′
αy iff f(x)Rαf(y) in W.
Then (T [A], (R′α)α∈S) is an RCS-model with Rα ⊆ R
′
α, for all α ∈ S. Hence,
denoting by R′′α the relations of RCS [A], we obtain R
′′
α ⊆ R
′
α, for each α ∈ S.
It follows that W simulates RCS [A] by f . Then, since W 1 B, we conclude
that RCS [A] 1 B, by Lemma 5.3. ✷
Remark 5.5. The proof of Theorem 3 provides an alternative way of show-
ing the finite model property for the logics RCS and RJS.
Theorem 3 yields an efficient decision procedure for the logics RC and
RJ. Firstly, given a positive formula A we let S = ℓ({A,B}) and build the
model RCS [A]. Secondly, we check if B is satisfied at the root of this model.
To estimate the complexity of this procedure we need to be more specific
about the chosen computation model.
We consider random access machines (see [10]) and assume that any
register can hold (the code of) any symbol including the variables and the
modalities. To simplify the estimates we count the size of any symbol as one,
and we assume that the elementary operations such as reading and writing
a symbol, as well as the comparison of symbols, cost a constant amount of
time. We are going to estimate the number of elementary steps needed to
decide whether A ⊢RC B. (Representing the variables and the modalities
more faithfully would introduce a logarithmic factor into our estimates.)
First, we estimate the time needed to build the model RCS [A] given A.
We support a data structure for a positive formula A (and for the corre-
sponding Kripke model T [A]) with the arrows represented by pointers. The
arrows are labeled by the elements of S, the nodes are labeled by the vari-
ables of A. We can also realize these labels as pointers to some extra nodes
representing the variables and the modalities, respectively. We assume that
there is a fixed ordering of arrows outgoing from any given node of the tree
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T [A] (which respects the left-to-right ordering of the corresponding subfor-
mulas of A). It is well-known that we can very efficiently (in a linear number
of steps) parse the formula A to build such a tree.
Next we bring T [A] to a special ordered form. Let L>m denote the
language LU with U = [m,ω]. A formula will be called a fact if it is either
⊤ or a conjunction of variables. Ordered formulas are defined inductively.
Definition 5.6. A formula A is ordered if it has the formA = F∧
∧
i<kmiAi
for some k (assuming A = F if k = 0), where
(i) F is a fact;
(ii) For each i, Ai ∈ L>mi and Ai is ordered;
(iii) m0 > m1 > . . . > mk−1.
Lemma 5.7. Every positive formula A is RJ-equivalent to an ordered one.
Proof. Induction on the build-up of A. The basis of induction and the case
of conjunction are easy. Suppose A = mB. By the induction hypothesis we
may assume B ordered, that is, B = F ∧
∧
i<kmiBi. If mB is not ordered,
there is an i < k such that mi < m. Let s be the minimal such i. Then mB
is equivalent to ⊤ ∧m(F ∧
∧
i<smiBi) ∧
∧k−1
i=s miBi, which is ordered. ✷
We notice that if an ordered formula B is obtained from A by the recur-
sive procedure described in Lemma 5.7, then the number of nodes in T [B]
is the same as in T [A]. One can also easily prove that RCS [B] will, in fact,
be isomorphic to RCS[A].
The algorithm of ordering a formula is similar to that of sorting a string,
and it is easy to obtain a rough quadratic upper bound, a detailed proof of
which we omit.
Lemma 5.8. Any formula A can be ordered in O(|A|2) steps.
An ordered formula A can be written in the following form:
A = F ∧
∧
i<k
∧
j<ni
miAij, (3)
with m0 > m1 > · · · > mk−1, Aij ∈ L>mi ordered and F a fact. Then
RCS [A] can be characterized as follows.
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Lemma 5.9. If A of the form (3) is ordered then RCS [A] consists of the
disjoint union of the models RCSi [Aij ], for all i < k and j < ni, augmented
by a new root a, where Si := S ∩ [mi, ω] and a  F . In addition to all the
relations inherited from the models RCSi [Aij ], only the following relations
hold in RCS [A]:
1. aRnx, for each i < k, n 6 mi, j < ni and x ∈ RCSi [Aij ];
2. xRny, for each i < k, mi+1 6 n < mi, and x, y ∈
⋃
p6i
⋃
j<np
RCSp [Apj]
(where we formally let mk = 0);
3. xRmiy, for each i < k, y ∈
⋃
j<ni
RCSi [Aij ] and x ∈
⋃
p<i
⋃
j<np
RCSp [Apj].
Proof. It is easy to see that all the relations mentioned in items 1–3 must
hold in RCS [A].
1. By the polytransitivity we have aRmix, for each x ∈ RCSi [Aij ]. Then,
by the monotonicity, aRnx, for all n 6 mi.
2. If x, y ∈
⋃
p6i
⋃
j<np
RCSp [Apj] then aRmix, y by Item 1, since mp >
mi, for each p 6 i. In particular, for each n < mi, there holds aRny. Then
by property (J) we obtain xRny.
3. For any x, y as specified we have aRmiy and aRmi−1x by Item 1. Since
mi−1 > mi, by (J) we obtain xRmiy.
It is also a routine but somewhat lengthy check that the model described
in Lemma 5.9 is, indeed, an RCS-model. Hence, it must coincide with
RCS [A]. ✷
A similar but much simpler characterization holds for RJS[A]. In this
case, we do not need to assume that A is ordered. If x, y ∈ T [A] let x ⊓ y
denote the greatest lower bound of x, y, that is, the unique node z such
that there are oriented paths from z to x and to y without any shared
edges. Given a nonempty path P let m(P ) denote the minimal modality
label occurring on P .
Lemma 5.10. Let x, y ∈ T [A], S = ℓ(A), and let X and Y be the uniquely
defined paths from x⊓y to the nodes x and y, respectively. Then xRny holds
in RJS [A] iff either x ⊓ y = x, x 6= y and m(Y ) = n, or both X and Y are
nonempty and m(X) > m(Y ) = n.
We omit a routine proof. Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10 yield efficient algorithms
to build the models RCS [A] and RJS[A].
Lemma 5.11. For any ordered formula A, the model RCS [A] can be con-
structed in O(|A|2 · |S|) many steps.
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Proof. In the course of constructing RCS [A] we add arrows to the initial
model T [A] in a systematic way. Assume A = F ∧
∧
i<k
∧
j<ni
miAij. Since
Aij ∈ LSi , we can apply the procedure recursively to build RCSi [Aij ], for
each i < k and j < ni. Then we join these models by a common root
and add the arrows according to clauses 1–3 of Lemma 5.9. Apart from the
computation time needed to build the models RCSi [Aij ], this requires only a
linear number of steps in the number of added arrows. Further, notice that
we never add an arrow twice (clauses 1–3 enumerate distinct fresh arrows
because of the choice of the sets Si). Thus, the total number of steps in
the whole computation is linear in the total number of arrows in the model
RCS [A] which can be roughly estimated by O(|A|
2 · |S|). ✷
Theorem 4. The logics RJ and RC are decidable in time bounded by a
polynomial (of degree three and four, respectively) in the length of the sequent
A ⊢ B.
Proof. It is well-known that the problem of checking whether a modal
formula ϕ is true at the root of a finite Kripke modelW in a finite signature
S is solvable in time O(‖W‖ · |ϕ|), where ‖W‖ denotes the sum of |W |
and the number of pairs (x, y) such that xRαy, for some α ∈ S (see [15,
Proposition 3.1]).6
Letting S = ℓ({A,B}) and n = |S| we can estimate |RCS [A]| by |A| and
‖RCS [A]‖ by O(|A|
2 · n). This yields a bound of the form O(|A|2 · n · |B|)
on the complexity of checking whether RCS [A]  B. By Lemmas 5.8 and
5.11 we have the same bound on the complexity of the original problem
A ⊢RC B. Noting that n 6 |A| + |B| yields a fourth degree polynomial
bound in the length |A|+ |B| of the input.
For the logic RJ this can be slightly improved. By Lemma 5.10, we
can observe that in the graph RJS [A] (where S = ℓ(A)) there is no more
than one arrow between any pair of points. This yields a bound O(|A|2) on
‖RJS [A]‖ and on the complexity of constructing this model. Consequently,
the derivability problem can be solved in O(|A|2 · |B|) many steps. ✷
Remark 5.12. Since the input of the problem is naturally divided into two
parts A and B, measuring the complexity in terms of two parameters |A| and
|B| appears to be more meaningful than expressing it in terms of the total
length of the input. Thus, the more informative bounds are O(|A|2 · n · |B|)
for RC and O(|A|2 · |B|) for RJ.
6‖W ‖ only measures the complexity of the frame, while the number of variables is
accounted for in |ϕ|.
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Next we turn to the logic RCω. We define RCωS [A] as the model whose
frame coincides with that of RCS [A] and whose valuation function v
′ satis-
fies:
v′(x, p) = 1 ⇐⇒ (v(x, p) = 1 or ∃y (xRωy and v(y, p) = 1)),
where v is the valuation of RCS [A]. Clearly, RCωS[A] is persistent.
Theorem 5. A ⊢RCω B iff RCωS [A]  B, where S = ℓ({A,B}).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3, we elaborate the (if) part.
IfA 0RCω B, there is a rooted persistent RCS-modelW such thatW  A
andW 1 B. By Lemma 5.4, there is a simulation f : T [A]→W. As before,
sinceW is an RCS-model, f lifts to a simulation of RCS [A] byW. We claim
that f also lifts to a simulation of RCωS[A] by W. Assume RCωS[A]  p.
If RCS[A]  p then W, f(x)  p and there is nothing to prove. If xRωy in
RCS [A] and RCS [A], y  p, then W, f(y)  p. Hence, by the persistence of
W, we obtainW, f(x)  p and the claim is proved. Therefore, sinceW 1 B,
we have RCωS[A] 1 B, as required. ✷
Now we notice that ‖RCωS[A]‖ has the same bound as ‖RCS [A]‖. Hence,
we obtain
Corollary 5.13. The logic RCω is decidable in time bounded by a polyno-
mial (of degree four) in the length of the sequent A ⊢ B.
6. Irreflexive models
The Solovay construction works with the irreflexive models. Therefore
we would like to have a characterization of RC and RCω in terms of suit-
able irreflexive models. We modify the construction of the canonical model
from the previous section. This modification is similar to the one given
by Dashkov [11] which in turn derives from the work of Japaridze [17] and
Ignatiev [16].
Let L be a logic containing RC and let Φ be an adequate set of formulas.
We work in the setup of the previous section. We define a Kripke model
W ′L/Φ which coincides with WL/Φ but for the definition of the relations.
We stipulate that xR′αy in W
′
L/Φ iff xRαy and following condition holds:
R4. There is a formula αA ∈ x such that αA /∈ y.
The model W ′L/Φ has the following properties.
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Lemma 6.1. (i) W ′L/Φ is an RJ-model;
(ii) All R′α are irreflexive;
(iii) R′α = ∅, for α /∈ ℓ(Φ).
In order to prove the canonical model lemma we need an additional fact.
Lemma 6.2. For any A and α, A 0RCω αA.
Proof. The simplest proof of this fact involves arithmetical interpretations.
Assume A ⊢RCω αA. Fix an arithmetical interpretation ∗ mapping all
variables to the standard numeration of PA. By Proposition 3.2 we obtain
A∗ ⊢PA Conα(A
∗). Since A is a positive formula, A∗ is (a numeration of)
a sound arithmetical theory T . However, this contradicts Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem for T . ✷
Lemma 6.3. For any A ∈ Φ, W ′L/Φ, x  A iff A ∈ x.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.5. We only treat somewhat
differently the case A = αB, the ‘if’ part.
Assume αB ∈ x. As before let ∆ := {βC : βC ∈ x, β < α} and let y be
the deductive closure of ∆∪{B} in Φ. By the IH we have y  B. We claim
that xR′αy which completes the argument.
We already know from Lemma 4.5 that xRαy. To check R4 it is sufficient
to observe that αB ∈ x but αB /∈ y. If αB ∈ y we would obtain Σ, B ⊢L αB,
for some finite Σ ⊆ ∆, but then
∧
Σ ∧ B ⊢L
∧
Σ ∧ αB ⊢L α(
∧
Σ ∧ B),
contradicting Lemma 6.2. ✷
A model W is called Φ-monotone, if for any αA ∈ Φ and β ∈ ℓ(Φ) such
that α < β, W ′L/Φ, x  βA implies W
′
L/Φ, x  αA.
Lemma 6.4. (i) W ′L/Φ is Φ-monotone;
(ii) W ′L/Φ is persistent if L contains RCω.
Proof. (i) Assume W ′L/Φ, x  βA, αA ∈ Φ and α < β ∈ ℓ(Φ). By the
adequacy of Φ we have βA ∈ Φ. Then by Lemma 6.3 we obtain βA ∈ x.
Hence, x ⊢L αA and since αA ∈ Φ also αA ∈ x. This yields W
′
L/Φ, x  αA
by Lemma 6.3.
Statement (ii) is obvious by Lemma 6.3, since WL/Φ is persistent. ✷
We summarize the information obtained so far for L = RCω.
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Proposition 6.5. Let Φ be a finite adequate set. Then there is a finite
model W such that
(i) W is an irreflexive RJ-model;
(ii) Rα = ∅, for all α /∈ ℓ(Φ);
(iii) W is Φ-monotone and persistent;
(iv) For any RCω-theory Γ in Φ there is a node x ∈ W such that, for any
formula A, A ∈ Γ iff W, x  A.
7. Arithmetical completeness
Theorem 6. For any sequent A ⊢ B the following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i) A ⊢ B is provable in RCω;
(ii) A∗ ⊢PA B
∗, for all arithmetical interpretations ∗;
(iii) A∗ ⊢ B∗, for all arithmetical interpretations ∗.
Proof. The implication from (i) to (ii) is Proposition 3.2. Statement (ii)
trivially implies (iii). To infer (i) from (iii) we argue by contraposition and
assume A 0RCω B. Consider a finite adequate set Φ containing A,B, and
let W be a finite Kripke model satisfying the conditions of Proposition 6.5.
It falsifies A ⊢ B at some node x. We can restrict W to the submodel
generated by x, so that W is rooted and falsifies A ⊢ B at the root.
Now we proceed to a Solovay-type construction. As usual, we identify
the nodes of W with a finite set of natural numbers {1, . . . , N} so that 1 is
the root. We then attach a new root 0 to W by stipulating that 0R0x, for
each x ∈ W . The valuation of variables at 0 will be the same as in 1, this
ensures that the new model is persistent. Abusing notation we denote this
model by the same letter W. We also assume that the Rα relations and the
forcing relation x  C on W are arithmetized in a natural way by bounded
(even open) arithmetical formulas.
We fix an arithmetical formula Prfn(x, y) naturally expressing that y
is a proof of a formula x from the axioms of PA and true Πn-sentences.
The formula Prfn(x, y) has logical complexity ∆n+1 in PA. Without loss
of generality we may also assume that Prfn is chosen in such a way that
each number y is a proof of at most one formula, and that any provable
formula has arbitrarily long proofs. These properties are also assumed to
hold provably in PA.
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The formula ✷n(x) := ∃y Prfn(x, y) expresses that x is provable in PA
from the set of all true Πn-sentences. We usually write ✷nϕ for ✷n(pϕq). It
is easy to see that Conn(σPA) is equivalent to ¬✷n⊥.
Definition 7.1. Let M denote the maximal modality m < ω occurring in
Φ, if there is such an m, and 0 otherwise. We define a family of Solovay-style
functions hn : ω →W, for all n < ω, as follows: hn(0) = 0 and
hn(x+ 1) =


y, if hi(x) 6= hi(x+ 1) = y, for some i < n; otherwise
z, if ∃k > max(M,n) Prfn(pℓk 6= z¯q, x) and
either hn(x)Rnz or hn(x)Rωz;
hn(x), otherwise.
Here ℓk denotes the limit of the function hk. The functions hn can be defined
in such a way as to satisfy the following conditions:
• The graph of each hn is definable by a formula Hn which is ∆n+1 in
PA;
• The function ϕ : n 7→ pHnq is primitive recursive;
• Each hn satisfies the clauses of Definition 7.1 provably in PA.
The definition of the functions hn can be arranged as a solution of a fixed
point equation in PA using the standard methods. The details are given in
the Appendix.
Informally, the behavior of the functions hn can be described as follows.
The functions with lower index have higher priority, therefore whenever hm
makes a move to y, all functions hn with n > m do the same. Otherwise,
hn moves like the usual Solovay function, but for the following peculiarities:
• hn also reacts to proofs of the limit statements for all functions of
lower priority (not only to those of itself);
• hn is not only allowed to move along the Rn relation but also along
Rω.
Lemma 7.2. For each n,m, provably in PA,
(i) ∃!z ∈W ℓn = z;
(ii) ℓnRn+1ℓn+1 or ℓnRωℓn+1 or ℓn = ℓn+1;
(iii) If m < n then ℓm = ℓn or ℓmRαℓn, for some α ∈ (m,n] ∪ {ω}.
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Proof. Statement (i) is proved by (external) induction on n. First, we
observe that, by the polytransitivity, the relation Rn ∪Rω is transitive and
irreflexive, for each n. Now it is easy to see that the limit of h0 exists, as h0
only moves along R0 ∪ Rω. Suppose ℓn−1 exists. As soon as hn−1 reaches
its limit, hn can only move along Rn ∪Rω. Hence, ℓn exists.
Statement (ii) follows from the same consideration and the fact that
hn+1 has to visit ℓn on its way to the limit. Statement (iii) is obtained from
(ii) by induction on n. ✷
Lemma 7.3. For all n, N  (ℓn = 0).
Proof. By Lemma 7.2, for all n > M , either ℓnRωℓn+1 or ℓn+1 = ℓn, as
Rk = ∅ for k > M . Since Rω is transitive and irreflexive, there is a z ∈ W
and an m such that ℓn = z, for all n > m. Assume z 6= 0 and let m be
the minimal n such that ℓn = z. Then the function hm has to come to z
by the second clause of Definition 7.1. Hence, for some n > max(M,m),
✷m(ℓn 6= z¯). Since PA is sound, ℓn 6= z¯ is true, which is not the case since
n > m. ✷
For any modal formula C, let ℓn  C denote
∨
{ℓn = a¯ : a  C}.
Lemma 7.4. For any formula C, for all n > m >M ,
PA ⊢ (ℓn  C)→ (ℓm  C).
Proof. Each hn for n > M can only follow the Rω relation. By the per-
sistence of W, the truth of any formula is inherited downwards along Rω.
Hence, the claim follows from Lemma 7.2. ✷
Lemmas 7.2, 7.4 are obviously formalizable in PA (uniformly in m,n).
Suppose {ϕi : i ∈ I} is a primitive recursive set of formulas. With a
primitive recursive program computing this set we associate a numeration
for the theory PA + {ϕi : i ∈ I} that will be denoted [ϕi : i ∈ I]. We write
Conn[ϕi : i ∈ I] for Conn([ϕi : i ∈ I]). In particular, if this set is a singleton
{ϕ}, the formula Conn[ϕ] means the same as Conn(ϕ) and is PA-equivalent
to ¬✷n¬ϕ.
Using this notation, we interpret each propositional variable p as follows:
p∗ := [ℓn  p : n >M ].
We prove the following two main lemmas.
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Lemma 7.5. For any formula C ∈ Φ,
[ℓn  C : n >M ] ⊢PA C
∗. (∗)
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. The cases of propositional variables,
⊤ and ∧ are easy.
Assume C = mD for m < ω. Since (mD)∗ = Conm(D
∗) numerates a
finite extension of PA, it will be sufficient in this case to infer Conm(D
∗)
from ℓM  mD in PA. We have, by the IH,
PA +Conm[ℓn  D : n >M ] ⊢ Conm(D
∗).
However, Conm[ℓn  D : n >M ] is equivalent to the formula
∀n >M Conm[
∧n
k=M(ℓk  D)],
which is by Lemma 7.4 equivalent to
∀n >M Conm[ℓn  D]. (4)
Thus, we are going to infer sentence (4) from ℓM  mD by formalizing
the following argument in PA. Assume ℓM  mD, hence there is a z such
that z  D and ℓMRmz. Consider the point ℓm. By Lemma 7.2, either
ℓmRkℓM for some k > m, or ℓmRωℓM or ℓm = ℓM . In each case, ℓmRmz, as
W is an RJ-frame.
Assume ∃n > M ¬Conm[ℓn  D], then ✷m(ℓn 1 D). Since (provably)
z  D, we have Prm[ℓn 6= z¯]. Let x0 be such that ∀x > x0 hm(x) = ℓm.
There is a y > x such that Prfm(pℓn 6= z¯q, y). Then, hm(y + 1) has to be
different from ℓm, a contradiction. This shows that ℓM  mD implies (4),
as required.
Consider the case C = ωD. Firstly, we have
[Conn(D
∗) : n >M ] ⊢PA (ωD)
∗,
where we may restrict the left hand side to n >M , since the strength of the
formulas Conn increases with n. By Lemma 7.4 and the IH, as before,
[∀k > n¯Conn[ℓk  D] : n >M ] ⊢PA [∀k >M Conn[ℓk  D] : n >M ]
⊢PA [Conn(D
∗) : n >M ].
We are going to show that
[ℓn  ωD : n >M ] ⊢PA [∀k > n¯Conn[ℓk  D] : n >M ].
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To this end it is sufficient to prove by an argument formalizable in PA that,
for any n >M ,
PA+ (ℓn  ωD) ⊢ ∀k > n¯Conn[ℓk  D].
Consider any n >M and assume ℓn  ωD. There is a z ∈ W such that
z  D and ℓnRωz. If ∃k > n¯ ✷n(ℓk 1 D) then ∃k > n¯ ✷n(ℓk 6= z¯). This
means that hn must take on a value other than ℓn, a contradiction. ✷
Lemma 7.6. For any formula C ∈ Φ,
ℓ0 6= 0 ∨ C
∗ ⊢PA [ℓn  C : n >M ]. (∗∗)
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. The cases of propositional variables,
⊤ and ∧ are trivial.
Assume C = mD for m < ω. Since ℓ0 6= 0 is equivalent to a Σ1-formula,
we obtain
PA+ ℓ0 6= 0 ∧ Conm(D
∗) ⊢ ✷0(ℓ0 6= 0) ∧ Conm(D
∗)
⊢ Conm(ℓ0 6= 0 ∨D
∗)
⊢ Conm[ℓk  D : k >M ]
⊢ ∀k >M Conm[ℓk  D].
Thus, it is sufficient to prove, for each n >M , that
PA ⊢ ℓ0 6= 0 ∧ ℓn 1 mD → ∃k >M ✷m(ℓk 1 D).
We reason as follows.
Assume ℓn 1 mD. By Lemma 7.2 we have ℓmRkℓn, for some k > m, or
ℓmRωℓn or ℓm = ℓn. Since W is a RJ-frame, in each case
ℓm 1 mD. (5)
Let a := ℓm, we have
∃x (hm(x) = a ∧ ∀y > x (hm−1(y) = hm−1(x))). (Lm(a))
(After hm attains its limit a, the function hm−1 only has the possibility
to make a single move to a, if it moves at all.) The statement Lm(a) is
expressible by a Σm+1-formula. Hence, ✷mLm(a¯). Moreover, Lm(a) implies
that hm goes along the Rm ∪ Rω relations from a onwards. Hence, for any
k > m, Lm(a) implies ℓk ∈ R
∗
m(a) ∪ {a}, where
R∗m(a) := {y ∈W : ∃α > m aRαy}.
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Therefore, we conclude:
∀k > m✷m(ℓk ∈ R
∗
m(a¯) ∪ {a¯}). (6)
On the other hand, we claim that ∀z ∈ R∗m(a) z 1 D. Indeed, if aRαz,
α > m and z  D, then a  αD whence a  mD, by the Φ-monotonicity of
W. This contradicts (5). Since the formula ∀z ∈ R∗m(a) z 1 D is bounded,
it follows that
✷m(∀z ∈ R
∗
m(a¯) z 1 D). (7)
Next we consider the minimal i 6 m such that ℓi = ℓm = a. Since we
assume ℓ0 6= 0, we also have ℓm = a 6= 0. The function hi could only have
come to a by the second clause of the definition of hi, therefore we obtain
∃k > max(i,M) ✷i(ℓk 6= a¯).
Since i 6 m, obviously we can weaken this to
∃k >M ✷m(ℓk 6= a¯). (8)
Together with (6) this yields ∃k > M ✷m(ℓk ∈ R
∗
m(a¯)), whence by (7) we
obtain ∃k >M ✷m(ℓk 1 D), as required.
Finally, consider the case C = ωD. We have
(ωD)∗ = [Conn(D
∗) : n ∈ ω].
For each of the axioms Conn(D
∗) such that n >M , by the IH and persistence
we obtain, as before,
PA + ℓ0 6= 0 ∧ Conn(D
∗) ⊢ ∀k >M Conn[ℓk  D].
This fact is formalizable in PA uniformly in n, therefore
ℓ0 6= 0 ∨ (ωD)
∗ ⊢PA [∀k >M Conn[ℓk  D] : n >M ].
We are going to show that
ℓ0 6= 0 ∨ [∀k >M Conn[ℓk  D] : n >M ] ⊢PA [ℓn  ωD : n > M ],
which completes the proof, because by Lemma 7.4
[ℓn  ωD : n > M ] ⊢PA [ℓn  ωD : n >M ].
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Thus, we prove by an argument formalizable in PA uniformly in n that,
for any n > M ,
PA+ (ℓ0 6= 0 ∧ ℓn 1 ωD) ⊢ ∃k >M ✷n(ℓk 1 D).
Assume n > M , ℓn 1 ωD and let a := ℓn. Since ℓ0 6= 0 we have a 6= 0.
Consider the minimal m 6 n such that ℓm = ℓn = a. As before, we first
show that
∀k > max(m,M) ✷n(ℓk ∈ Rω(a¯) ∪ {a¯}). (9)
We consider two cases. If m > M then we have both Lm(a) and
✷m(Lm(a¯)). Moreover, for k > m > M , from Lm(a¯) we can infer ℓk ∈
Rω(a¯) ∪ {a¯}, since hk can only make moves along the Rω relation from a
onwards. (Here, Rω(a) := {x ∈ W : aRωx}.) Hence, ∀k > m ✷m(ℓk ∈
Rω(a¯) ∪ {a¯}) and the claim holds.
If m 6 M < n we first notice that ℓM = a. Then, ✷n(ℓM = a¯),
since the formula ℓM = a¯ is ΣM+2 ⊆ Σn+1. Moreover, ℓM = a implies
ℓk ∈ Rω(a) ∪ {a}, for any k > M , since hk will only be able to move along
Rω from a onwards. Thus, we obtain ∀k > M ✷n(ℓk ∈ Rω(a¯) ∪ {a¯}), and
the claim also holds.
Secondly, we note that ℓk ∈ Rω(a) implies ℓk 1 D, as ∀z ∈ Rω(a) z 1 D.
Hence, by (9),
∀k > max(m,M) ✷n(ℓk 1 D ∨ ℓk = a¯). (10)
Thirdly, since a 6= 0, by the definition of hm we have
∃k > max(M,m) ✷m(ℓk 6= a¯).
Together with (10) this yields ∃k > max(M,m) ✷n(ℓk 1 D). In either case
we obtain ∃k >M ✷n(ℓk 1 D). ✷
Recall that at the node 1 ∈ W there holds 1  A and 1 1 B. Let σ
denote [ℓn = 1 : n >M ] and S denote the corresponding theory. By Lemma
7.5, σ ⊢PA A
∗. On the other hand, by Lemma 7.6
ℓ0 6= 0 ∨B
∗ ⊢PA [ℓn  B : n >M ] ⊢PA [ℓn 6= 1 : n >M ].
Hence, A∗ ⊢ B∗ yields S ⊢ ℓM 6= 1. It follows that S is inconsistent. Since
PA ⊢ ℓn = 1 → ℓm = 1, for all m 6 n, the inconsistency of S yields a
PA-proof of ℓn 6= 1, for some n > M . This means that h0 must eventually
take on a value other than 0, hence ℓ0 6= 0. But this is impossible, since
ℓ0 = 0 is true in the standard model. ✷
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Example 7.7. By Example 4.3, ωp ∧ ωq 0RCω ω(p ∧ q). By Theorem 6,
this means that there are theories S, T containing PA such that
PA+ RFN(S) + RFN(T ) 0 RFN(S + T ).
Primitive recursive numerations of these theories can be obtained from the
proof of Theorem 6 applied to (an irreflexive version of) the three-element
Kripke model described in Example 4.3.
We remark that none of these two theories can have bounded arithmetical
complexity over PA. Suppose S is axiomatized by a set of Πn+1-sentences
over PA. Then, by Lemma 3.3, Conn(σ) ⊢PA σ. By Corollary 3.6, it follows
that
PA +Conω(σ) + Conω(τ) ⊢ Conω(τ ∨ Conn(σ)) ⊢ Conω(τ ∨ σ).
This shows that the use of infinitely axiomatized theories to interpret propo-
sitional variables is necessary for the validity of Theorem 6.
8. Conclusions
We believe that positive provability logic, despite the absence of Lo¨b’s
axiom, strikes a good balance between expressivity and efficiency (the latter
can be understood formally, as the computational efficiency, as well as in-
formally, in the sense of convenience). Together with [11] this paper shows
that positive logic can be nicely treated both syntactically and semantically.
More importantly, it has very natural proof-theoretic interpretations not
extendable to the full modal logic language.
There are many questions related to this logic that can be further in-
vestigated. One direction is to study normal positive logics along the lines
of the usual normal modal logics. In particular, we are interested in their
efficient proof systems, general results on axiomatization and completeness,
interpolation properties, and so on.
Another direction is the study of different arithmetical interpretations of
positive provability logic. For example, one can consider from this point of
view transfinite iterations of consistency assertions (or of higher reflection
principles). That is, one can introduce modalities ✸α, for each ordinal α of
some canonical ordinal notation system, and interpret them as the schemata
Conα related to the so-called Turing progressions: Con0(σ) = Con(σ);
Conα(σ) = {Con[Conβ(σ)] : β < α}. It would be interesting to find a
complete axiomatization of the corresponding positive logic.
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Another generalization is to consider stronger reflection schemata defin-
able in the extensions of arithmetical language, e.g., in the second order
arithmetic or in the arithmetic enriched by truthpredicates. This general-
ization is particularly interesting from the point of view of applications in
the ordinal analysis of predicative theories.
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Appendix A. Arithmetization of the Solovay functions
Given a finite irreflexive RJ-frame W we would like to build a family of
arithmetical functions hn : ω → W, for all n ∈ ω, satisfying the following
conditions:
• The graph of each hn is definable by a formula Hn which is ∆n+1 in
PA;
• There is a primitive recursive function ϕe : n 7→ pHnq, where e denotes
the primitive recursive index of this function;
• Each hn provably satisfies the clauses of Definition 7.1.
These objects will be constructed using the formalized recursion theorem.
The main unknown is the index e.
Firstly, we stipulate that the limit statements ℓn = z are abbreviations
for the formulas ∃N ∀k > N Hn(k, z). Secondly, we fix a primitive recursive
function g0 such that
pℓn = z¯q = g0(pHnq, z) = g0(ϕe(n), z).
We see that the function g(e, n, z) := g0(ϕe(n), z) is provably total recursive
in PA, hence it is definable by an arithmetical ∆1-formula.
Using g, Definition 7.1 can be rewritten to define the graphs of hn in
the language of arithmetic with the unknown e as an extra parameter. We
denote such parametrized versions of the formulas Hn by H
′
n. Each formula
H ′n uses the formulas H
′
0, . . . ,H
′
n−1 as subformulas to express the first clause
of the definition of hn. Thus, we obtain a sequence of formulas of the
following form:
H ′0(e, x, y) ↔ A0(e, x, y)
H ′1(e, x, y) ↔ A1(H
′
0; e, x, y)
. . .
H ′n(e, x, y) ↔ An(H
′
0, . . . ,H
′
n−1; e, x, y)
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Here, the formulas An directly mimic Definition 7.1. It is easy to convince
oneself that the arithmetical complexity of the formulas An (and hence, of
the formulas H ′n) is ∆n+1 in PA. The most complex part of the definition
is the formula ∃k > max(M,n) Prfn(pℓk 6= z¯q, x) occurring in the second
clause. In the formula An this part takes the form
∃k > max(M,n) Prfn(g(e, k, z), x).
Observe that the predicate Prfn is ∆n+1 (even ∆0(Σn)), and the existential
quantifier ∃k can, in fact, be bounded by x. This yields a ∆n+1-formula.
It is also clear that each formulaH ′n is obtained from the previous ones in
a primitive recursive way. Therefore, there is a primitive recursive function
F satisfying F (e, n) = pH ′n(e¯, x, y)q. Finally, we obtain the required number
e by applying (a formalized version of) recursion theorem for primitive recur-
sive functions: ϕe(n) := F (e, n). Then we can define Hn(x, y) := H
′
n(e¯, x, y).
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